Shareholder voting is one of the fundamental mechanisms through which corporate governance is exercised, yet to date it has not been systematically analyzed across countries. We study the votes cast by U.S. institutional investors in elections held by 5,211 firms across 46 countries to assess the impact of internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) corporate governance on shareholder voting patterns. The propensity to vote against management's recommendations increases with managerial entrenchment, indicating that firm-level governance plays an important role in voting decisions for firms domiciled around the world. This effect is stronger when external country-level governance is relatively weak. Further, we provide evidence that independent proxy voting recommendations are closely linked to the voting patterns of shares held in non-U.S. firms, and this effect is stronger for firms domiciled in countries with weak external governance. 
Introduction
Corporate governance has long been an important topic in the field of finance because it is the fundamental mechanism through which shareholders ensure a return on the money they invest in the equity of firms. Further, it is through the process of shareholder voting that corporate governance is actually exercised. The U.S. has long maintained a proxy system that governs the way in which investors vote their shares in a public company regardless of whether they attend shareholder meetings.
The topic of shareholder voting has become increasingly prominent in recent years as the emphasis on ensuring proper corporate governance has grown (see Yermack (2010) for a review of the literature on voting patterns for U.S. firms). In light of this movement, the U.S. SEC announced in July 2010 that it would undertake a concept release seeking public comment on the U.S. proxy system and asking whether rule revisions should be considered to promote greater efficiency and transparency. 1 As the above quote makes clear, regulators believe that voting is indeed fundamental to the exercise of corporate governance.
While the study of corporate governance and voting patterns for U.S. firms certainly matters given the size and importance of U.S. stock markets, the impact of governance and voting can potentially be much greater in settings outside of the U.S. Across the world, 1 In their concept release, the SEC noted that it has been nearly 30 years since the Commission last conducted a comprehensive review of the proxy voting infrastructure. With significant changes since then in shareholder demographics, technology, and other areas, the Commission's review of the U.S. proxy system will examine emerging issues that either did not exist or were not considered significant three decades ago.
shareholders of firms face far greater dispersion in both shareholder protection and corporate disclosure which, when lacking, make the exercise of corporate governance more important and also more difficult. This potential lack of protection and transparency is the driving force behind the burgeoning literature on international corporate governance that has developed over the past decade (see Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) and Denis and McConnell (2003) for surveys of this literature).
As these survey papers show, the need to fully understand the drivers and outcomes of international corporate governance remains as strong as ever. To our knowledge, no large scale cross-country research on shareholder voting patterns across a set of firms and countries that differ in their levels of expected governance and transparency has been conducted to date.
In this paper, we conduct such a study. Specifically, we examine the linkage between voting patterns for and against management proposals put forth for shareholder voting and firm-and country-level characteristics that capture governance and transparency, and whether these patterns depend on recommendations given by proxy advisory firms.
While the theory and basic intuition that underpins corporate governance indicates that the process of shareholder voting for non-U.S. firms should clearly be important, it is nonetheless difficult to predict ex ante the voting patterns that may actually be uncovered.
Shareholders might of course attempt to use their voting power to steer managers in the direction of better governance. This is the outcome suggested by recent research papers that, collectively, examine U.S. institutions' voting for director outcomes, U.K. "say on pay"
voting, and institutional investors' survey responses in the U.S. and the Netherlands. Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) report that while U.S. institutions overwhelmingly cast "For" votes in director elections held by U.S. firms, greater managerial entrenchment is associated with more "Against" votes being cast. For U.K. firms, Ferri and Maber (2009) and Carter and Zamora (2009) find that greater dissent voting in say on pay elections results in several outcomes: greater sensitivity of CEO cash and total compensation to negative operating performance, curbing of excess salaries, and a lessening of equity holder dilution due to stock option grants. More directly related to our paper, McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010) conduct a survey on the corporate governance preferences of institutions that invest in U.S-.
and Netherlands-based firms and report that 66% of the 118 survey respondents state that voting against the company at the annual meeting is among the corrective actions they would take to express governance concerns. shareholder votes, which could lessen investors' beliefs that the votes cast will be meaningfully interpreted. Additionally, the clinical study of the activist-style Hermes U.K.
2 There is also a nascent research stream on the prevalence of vote lending, which provides additional (albeit indirect) evidence that shareholder voting is important for institutional investors (see Christofferson, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2007) , Hu and Black (2007, 2008) , and Aggarwal, Saffi, and Sturgess (2010) ). 3 In contrast to these findings, Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2010) study U.S. institutions' portfolio holdings of foreign firms from 2003 to 2008 and find that greater institutional ownership over time is correlated with improvements in firm-level governance.
focus fund by Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) shows that even activist investors may prefer to express governance concerns via private engagement rather than public voting.
Consistent with these results, the McCahery et al. (2010) survey also documents that 80% of institutional investors are prepared to sell shares and 55% are prepared to initiate private discussions with the executive board to express concerns with governance. Taken together, these papers indicate that shareholder voting may not be an effective way to exercise governance because either: 1) concerned investors are simply not present because they do not expect to be able to change the governance of firms when they find it lacking, or 2) investors believe it is better to use private channels to communicate with management. The main dependent variable in our tests is a measure of the percentage of the overall votes cast that go against the recommendation of management for a given fiscal year and firm.
We also examine the voting patterns for different agenda items by organizing Voting
Analytics' agenda item codes into sub-groups that capture whether the item pertains to directors, compensation, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), firm capitalization, antitakeover provisions, or routine business issues.
For our tests, the primary variable of interest is Insider control which measures the percentage of shares held by insiders. We use this firm-level governance measure to proxy for the degree of controlling shareholder entrenchment and thus a greater ex ante possibility that outside (minority) shareholders can be expropriated. This measure excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity by institutional investors. We also include coverage by equity analysts because they can provide both information production and external oversight to firms that they cover. Finally, we include a number of firm-level control variables from Worldscope.
Our results show that Insider control is significantly positively associated with the votes cast against management's recommendations. This suggests that U.S. institutional investors are more likely to vote against management in firms with greater possibility of outside (minority) shareholders expropriation. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in Insider control is associated with a 6.8% increase in votes cast against management. We also find evidence that shareholders are less likely to vote against management's recommendations for firms with greater analyst coverage. These results are consistent with the idea that analysts provide external monitoring that can uncover, and thus possibly deter, controlling shareholder expropriation, which reduces the need for shareholders to make a vote against management's recommendations.
It is helpful to frame some of our paper's findings in the context of recent research on shareholder voting in U.S. firms. Cai et al. (2009) In our BNYMellon sample of non-U.S. firms we find that ISS recommendations to vote against management are very highly correlated with the actual votes cast that go against management. In our sample, an unfavorable recommendation by ISS is associated with 60% fewer votes in favor of management. Further, regressions show that an ISS recommendation to vote against management is positively and significantly associated with shareholders' votes going against management. In fact, it is the only significant factor in such models. The magnitudes suggested by the coefficients from our BNYMellon sample tests indicate that ISS recommendations are particularly important for the voting of shares in non-U.S. firms.
In further tests using the BNYMellon sample, we examine whether different levels of external country-level governance affect the relationship between independent proxy voting recommendations and institutional investors' voting. Despite the relatively small sample sizes, our splits into "low" and "high" governance subsamples show that the ISS recommendations have a stronger effect on the propensity to vote against management for firms from countries with poor governance.
Taken together, our evidence from a large sample across many countries shows that the process of shareholder voting plays an important role in the exercise of corporate governance outside of the U.S. Thus, while it may be the case that a set of potentially interested shareholders do not own shares in non-U.S. firms because of expected governance problems, 4 the shareholders who do hold stakes not only exercise their right to vote, but they also choose to challenge management more often in cases of entrenched management and low analyst coverage. It also appears that their voting patterns rely heavily on independent proxy recommendations. Overall, we conclude that today's shareholders of non-U.S. firms choose to exercise corporate governance by voting their shares in a meaningful way.
5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the research design, our data, and sample selection. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 4 concludes.
Research Design, Sample Selection, and Data
We design our tests to investigate the voting patterns of shareholders of non-U.S.
firms. An ideal dataset to use for this task would be a mapping of votes cast by all holders domiciled in all countries of the proposals put forth for voting by all non-U.S. firms. 4 Given data limitations, our test design does not attempt to assess whether this outcome implied by Parrino et al. (2003) and Leuz et al. (2009) countries for all such votes to be cast with fiduciary duty as the driving factor. We therefore conclude that our voting pattern data source is reasonable to employ for our study.
We obtain the voting data from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Voting Analytics database.
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This database provides the identity and country of domicile of companies holding elections, the shareholder meeting date, the agenda item descriptions, the number of "For", "Against", "Abstain", and "Withhold" votes of institutional owners, and the management's recommendations. held by pension/benefit plans; and (5) Shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. Importantly for our analysis it explicitly excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity and shares held by insurance companies, which are the exact "outsider"
shareholders whose voting patterns we are trying to assess. The idea behind this measure is that higher levels of insider control will correspond to greater insider entrenchment and a lesser ability for outsiders to challenge the usage of such control. We refer to this measure as
Insider control. For robustness we also use a threshold measure of Insider control that equals one if a firm's Insider control is larger than the median value of Insider control in the firm's country, and zero otherwise. We refer to this threshold measure as High insider control.
We employ a firm-level proxy for transparency and potential outside monitoring.
Specifically, equity analysts are associated with increased information production and external oversight for non-U.S. firms (see Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) ). As such, we include in our regressions the number of analysts (Analysts) that make forecasts for a firm in a given fiscal year obtained from the I/B/E/S database.
We also use a number of other firm-level control variables. Because the total amount of investible equity is likely to matter to U.S. institutions, we control for the Investible equity market cap measured as the market capitalization of equity multiplied by one minus insider control. We control for growth opportunities including the Market-to-book ratio defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. We measure firm performance with Profitability, defined as net income plus interest expenses divided by total assets. Research conducted on U.S. firms shows that investors are more inclined to disagree with management following poor firm performance (see, for example, Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008), Cai et al. (2009), and Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, and White (2009) ). We also control for Leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Highly levered firms might attract less outside investment because they face greater bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, investors bearing this greater risk may be more inclined to monitor such firms.
We also follow Leuz et al. (2009) and include a dummy variable that measures whether the firm is cross-listed on a major U.S. stock exchange (Cross-list). Cross-listed firms are likely to have better governance and higher levels of disclosure associated with their U.S. presence, which reduces information asymmetries between outside investors and insiders. (2010)). The sample includes large firms with median assets of $2.0 billion, but, as the quartile breakdown shows, it also includes a significant portion of firms with assets of less than $0.7 billion and in excess of $6.9 billion. The firms are generally followed by analysts with the median firm having nine analyst forecasts, and have a median insider ownership of about 35%.
As mentioned, several recent papers using U.S. firm data show that the proxy voting recommendations given by ISS can have a significant impact on voting in non-contested elections. Ideally, for our study we would obtain the voting recommendations made by ISS and track the way in which they are correlated with the votes cast by institutional holders of non-U.S. firms. Unfortunately, while ISS has an available database tracking the voting recommendations they make for U.S. firms (which allowed the above-cited studies to be conducted), they do not have such a database for non-U.S. firms. Because this component of the shareholder voting process is interesting for non-U.S. firms as well, we take another approach to assess it. We employ a proprietary BNYMellon database of the votes cast during shareholder meetings held in the first half of 2009 by shareholders of non-U.S. firms with American Depository Receipts (ADRs) that are sponsored by BNYMellon. This database contains information on the votes cast by ADR shareholders, the voting direction recommended by management, and, importantly, the voting recommendations, if any, provided by ISS. While this sample is quite small in terms of firms (134), it contains data on voting patterns for 1,887 unique voting recommendations made by ISS, and thus allows us to address the relevance of ISS recommendations for non-U.S. firms in a meaningful way.
In our research design, we focus on non-contested elections, which constitute the vast majority of voting situations faced by firms. In contrast, contested elections refer to those in which a dissident actively and formally solicits votes for a slate of directors in opposition to incumbent management: such elections occur with mild frequency in the U.S. and the U.K. 9, 10 but are to our knowledge infrequent or nonexistent in most other countries around the world.
9 Alexander, Chen, Seppi, and Spatt (2009) study contested elections in U.S. firms and conclude that proxy advisor recommendations bring new information to the market and that recommendations in favor of dissidents have a cumulative abnormal stock return of several percentage points. Buchanan, Netter, and Yang (2009) find that shareholder-initiated proposals for U.S. firms are associated with more significant subsequent policy changes than shareholder proposals put forth for U.K. firms. 10 Only 241 of the 15,678 firm years with shareholder elections feature one or more proposals coded by ISS as being shareholder initiated. We choose to include these proposals in our final sample but note here that all of our results hold in magnitude and significance when these elections are dropped from our sample.
Empirical Tests and Results

Construction of the Empirical Model
We want to assess whether U.S. institutional investors are sufficiently concerned about potential corporate governance problems such that they use their voting power to make their preferences for better governance known to managers of non-U.S. firms that they hold in their portfolios. To investigate this proposition empirically, we estimate OLS regression models with the dependent variable Against management. Recall that this variable compiles the average fraction of votes that went against the direction recommended by management for each firm year. 11 We use Insider control as our primary variable of interest from a direct governance perspective. We expect that greater levels of managerial entrenchment that result from higher levels of insider control will coincide with a greater incidence of institutional investors voting against the direction of voting recommended by management.
Before we assess the effect of our entrenchment proxy, we first discuss in more detail several of the variables likely to affect the frequency with which institutions vote against management's recommendations. Lang et al. (2004) conclude that a greater number of analysts covering a firm corresponds to a higher level of external oversight that may shed light on, and possibly deter, actions taken by controlling shareholders that go against the interest of minority outside shareholders. If true, such external governance could lessen the need for shareholders to vote against management's recommendations and we would expect to observe a negative relation between Against Management and Analysts.
Another variable likely to matter to institutional investors is the total size of the available float in which they can invest, Investible equity market cap. We do not have clear predictions for this variable. Larger firms are likely to have both a greater demand for information about their activities as well as a greater production of such information. Along the same reasoning behind analyst coverage, greater information production may shed light on actions that are possibly harmful to outside shareholders, thus it may be that there is less need for investors to vote against management. However, the deeper pool of liquidity that comes with a large degree of investible float can also make it easier for investors to simply vote with their feet (i.e., sell their shares) if they don't like the management of the firm rather than voting against management when it comes time to do so. That said, the returns to active voting against management if management subsequently improves governance of the firm would be potentially larger for firms with more investible float for the very same reason:
portfolio investors could more easily sell out and capture profits after governance improvements are made. Thus, while investible float seems to be an important control variable it is not clear what ex ante prediction should be made for its sign in our regression models.
Predictions for Leverage, Market-to-book, and Profitability were briefly discussed in Section 2. Generally, we expect that institutional shareholders will be more likely to exercise their votes in a meaningful way when firms have higher leverage, lower growth prospects, and lower profitability, although some of these expected relations are likely to be nuanced.
Finally, we expect that investors will be less likely to vote against management's proposals for firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. One of the reasons is that shareholders of crosslisted firms face a lower risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) Finally, because it could be the case that U.S. institutions are relatively more or less concerned with voting against management depending upon the type of agenda item up for a shareholder vote, we employ separate regression models that feature each of the groupings of voting agenda items reported in Table 3 . The exception is for votes taken on antitakeover provisions. This grouping is excluded because we have only 619 observations of antitakeover votes, a number that is too low for a meaningful analysis that controls for industry, country, and year fixed effects. 
Results for the Full Sample
We start our analysis by assessing the relation between corporate governance and the frequency with which outside shareholders vote their shares against management's recommendations using tests that capture the effect of firm-level governance across a wide range of countries. Turning to other variables in the regression models, we observe that Analysts is significantly negatively related to voting against management in the full sample and for routine and directors. This coefficient, however, is not significant in other voting categories.
Overall, the negative coefficient in several of the models is consistent with the idea that analysts provide external monitoring that may uncover, and possibly deter, controlling shareholder expropriation, which lessens the need for shareholders to make a vote against management's recommendations. The coefficient on Investible equity market cap is not consistently signed over the range of voting categories and overall, yet it is significant in all but two of the voting categories. As mentioned, this variable is likely to be important for institutional shareholders, but its linkage to voting patterns has no clear cut expectation. This is borne out in the models. As expected, the dummy variable for U.S. exchange listed firms (Cross-list) is negative and significant in our full model, which suggests that cross-listings in the U.S. are associated with fewer votes against management.
13 From Table I of Cai et al. (2009) , the standard deviation of their entrenchment index is 1.06, and the average percent "For" votes is 93.03%, thus, on average the percent "Against" votes is 6.07% (= 1-0.9393). Multiplying the coefficient on the entrenchment index of -0.38 (from their Table II ) with a one standard deviation increase in the entrenchment index (1.06) results in a decrease in "For" votes of 0.4028, or alternatively an increase in "Against" votes of the same magnitude. Thus, in percentage terms, a one standard deviation increase in their entrenchment index is associated with a 6.6% (= 0.4028/6.07) increase in "Against" votes.
Panel B of Table 4 reports results for the threshold measure High insider control.
Consistent with the Panel A results, the coefficients on High insider control are positively and significantly related to the percentage of votes against management overall and for agenda items classified as director elections, compensation issues, and M&A (but not for capital authorization or routine business issues). Therefore, the results are consistent across both measures of insider control. For space considerations, we report the remainder of our results using the continuous Insider control variable, but we note here that we also obtain similar results using the threshold measure.
Taken together, the results in Table 4 provide support for the notion that, across a broad set of countries, institutional shareholders' votes are cast more frequently against the wishes of management in firms with higher levels of managerial entrenchment, indicating that firm-level governance plays an important role in voting decisions. Additionally, the results provide only moderate support for the idea that greater numbers of equity analysts following a firm lessen the need to vote against management's recommendations, which could stem from an oversight role played by analysts. However, as noted before, the effect of insider control and analyst coverage is likely to be muted in countries with strong protection of outside shareholders. Therefore, we next conduct tests that discriminate based on country-level governance.
Results Segmented by Country-level Parameters
Greater protection of minority shareholders reduces the private benefits of control and thus should affect the need to exercise corporate governance at the firm level (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2010) ). We hypothesize that U.S. institutional shareholders will face larger governance problems in countries with weak investor protection rules. As such, it is likely that they will be more interested in shaping the governance of firms in these countries.
Similarly, the monitoring role of analysts is likely to be more important in weak investor protection countries. To capture the interplay between firm-and country-level governance effects, we re-estimate our previous regressions, partitioning the sample based on four country-level governance measures: Anti-self-dealing, Securities regulation, Disclosure requirements, and Common law legal origin. By estimating subsample models, we explicitly allow for differences in all coefficients across the two subsamples and country level fixed effects. In Tables 6, 7 , and 8 we repeat the procedure followed in Table 5 and again separate our countries into low and high shareholder protection subsamples. For these three tables, we split our full sample based on whether a country scores below or above the median Securities regulation score of 0.52, into whether a country scores below or above the median Disclosure requirements score of 0.75, and into whether countries have Common law legal origins. We find results broadly similar to those contained in Table 5 .
More specifically, in the Securities regulation sample splits of Table 6 the coefficients on Insider control are generally higher in the low Securities regulation subsample, although the statistical significance of the test of differences between high and low subsamples is not significant at traditional levels (i.e., below 10%). In Table 7 we split based on Disclosure requirements. We find that in the low Disclosure requirements subsample the coefficients on
Insider control are positive and significant for the full set of agenda items as well as in four of the five agenda item categories. Further, the Insider control coefficients are different at the 5% significance level between the low and high disclosure subsamples in the first and second models. In Table 8 , not-Common law legal origin countries are the ones likely to have poor external shareholder protection, and we find results similar to the splits based on Anti-selfdealing reported in Table 5 . In not-Common law countries the coefficient on Insider control is positive and significant overall and in four of the five agenda item categories and the difference in Insider control effects between the not-Common law and Common law subsamples is significant at the 5% level in the first, third, and fourth models.
Collectively, these four sets of country-level corporate governance splits provide support for the notion that managerial entrenchment matters more for shareholder voting when external country-level governance is relatively weak. We observe U.S. institutions increasing their percentage of votes against management's recommendations when the potential for minority shareholder expropriation is greater. Turning to the importance of Analysts, only one external country-level shareholder protection split (Disclosure requirements) shows statistically significant support for the idea that analysts' information gathering and monitoring activities are associated with a lesser need to vote against management when external shareholder protection is low. We therefore conclude that U.S.
institutional investors' voting patterns are not uniquely impacted by analysts' activities when outsider shareholder protection is weak.
The Importance of Proxy Voting Recommendations
We next want to assess the importance of proxy voting recommendations given by ISS for votes cast by shareholders of non-U.S. firms. As discussed in Section 2, ISS does not have an available dataset tracking the voting recommendations for non-U.S. firms. Therefore, Thus, an ISS recommendation against an agenda item is associated with 60% fewer favorable votes cast in the direction of management. While it is not possible to unequivocally assess causality in our modest sample, the correlations constitute initial evidence that the recommendations made by proxy advisory services such as ISS are likely to have substantial influence on the voting in non-U.S. firms.
We next control for the range of firm-level variables that may also affect investors' decisions to vote against management in a regression framework to assess whether the strong correlation between ISS voting recommendations and ADR-holder votes remains robust. In Table 10 we report regression analysis of the determinants of investors' votes against management's recommendations, controlling for the same independent variables as in the regression models of Tables 4 through 8 Specifically, we find that the coefficient on ISS against management is 0.394 with a t-statistic of 3.26 (p-value < 1%). No other variables are significant in these regressions. These results suggest that ADR shareholders are substantially more likely to vote against management when ISS recommends voting against management. The lack of significance on Insider control could result from a lack of meaningful variation in this small sample or because its relevance is captured as part of the ISS recommendation-data limitations preclude further tests on this issue.
Next, we follow the same line of reasoning used for our country splits in Tables 5   through 8 and test whether different levels of external country-level governance affect the relationship between independent proxy voting recommendations and investors' voting. In columns 2 through 7 we split the sample into "low" and "high" governance subsamples using the Anti-self-dealing index, the Securities regulation measure, and the measure of Disclosure requirements (we use the same cutoffs as in Tables 5-7) . 15 For all three external governance measures, we find that investors follow ISS recommendations to vote against management more often when governance is weak. In these three splits, the coefficients on ISS against management are all larger in the "low" compared to "high" external governance subsamples Taken together, our results provide the first outside-the-U.S. evidence on the importance of proxy voting recommendations for the actual votes cast in shareholder elections. We find strong evidence that ISS voting recommendations are closely linked to shareholders' voting patterns, and that this effect is incrementally pronounced in settings where outside shareholder protection is likely to be weakest.
Conclusion
The right to vote is arguably the most fundamental tool behind shareholder corporate governance. The impact of shareholder voting can potentially be much greater outside of the U.S. as such firms face a far greater range of shareholder protection and corporate disclosure which makes the proper exercise of corporate governance by shareholders both more difficult and more important. Nonetheless, academic research has largely ignored this form of governance for firms outside of the U.S.
To our knowledge, this paper conducts the first empirical study assessing voting document a larger correlation between poor governance and the propensity to vote against management. A one standard deviation increase in our entrenchment measure corresponds to a 6.8% increase in overall voting against management, and a 17.5% increase in votes that go against management's recommendation for director elections in particular, which is considerably greater than the 6.6% increase documented for U.S. firms (see Cai et al. (2009) ).
We find in some models that greater analyst coverage corresponds to less frequent voting against management, which provides moderate support for the idea that analysts provide external monitoring that might deter shareholder expropriation.
Further, we document that differences in governance quality across countries affect shareholder voting. We find that shareholders' propensity to vote against management's recommendations when insider control is higher is on average about three times as large when firms. First, we document that investors rely heavily on the ISS recommendations when voting their stakes in firms domiciled outside of the U.S. In more than 90% of the cases when the ADR holders reject the management recommendation, they follow ISS. Further, this very strong correlation between ISS recommendations and institutions' voting patterns is confirmed in a regression framework, and the linkage is even stronger when external countrylevel shareholder protection is weakest.
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Table 3 Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for voting and firm-level variables. The voting data are from the Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) Voting Analytics database compiled from SEC Form N-PX. Against management is the percentage of U.S. institutional investors' votes cast against management's recommendations for all agenda items proposed at a firm's shareholder meetings for a given fiscal year. We count votes as against management's recommendations when management recommended "For" and investors voted "Against", "Abstain", or "Withhold"; or when management recommended "Against" and investors voted "For", "Abstain", or "Withhold." Detailed descriptions of the categorization of the subcategory voting variables are reported in Appendix A. Insider control, obtained from Worldscope, is the percentage of closely held shares. This measure captures insider holdings and specifically excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity by institutional investors. It includes: (1) shares held by officers, directors and their immediate families; (2) shares held in trust; (3) shares of the company held by any other corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial institutions); (4) shares held by pension/benefit plans; and (5) shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. High insider control is a threshold measure of Insider control equal one if a firm's Insider control is larger than the median Insider control in the firm's country, zero otherwise. Analysts, obtained from I/B/E/S, is the number of analysts that make forecasts for a firm in a given fiscal year. Data for the remaining firm-level variables are from Worldscope. Investible equity market cap is the market value of publicly available stock calculated as market capitalization of equity multiplied with one minus insider control. Total assets is measured in billions of US$. Leverage is total debt to total assets. Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Profitability is net income plus interest expenses to total assets. Cross-list is a dummy variable equal one if the firm is cross-listed on a major U.S. stock exchange, zero otherwise. B) . Insider control, obtained from Worldscope, is the percentage of closely held shares. This measure captures insider holdings and specifically excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity by institutional investors. High insider control is a threshold measure of Insider control equal one if a firm's Insider control is larger than the median Insider control in the firm's country, zero otherwise. Analysts, obtained from I/B/E/S, is the number of analysts that make forecasts for a firm in a given fiscal year. All other firm-level variables are described in Table 3 ; Appendix A provides descriptions of the voting variables. All time-varying independent variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the meeting. Indicator variables for years, countries, and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell (1996) This measure captures insider holdings and specifically excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity by institutional investors. Analysts, obtained from I/B/E/S, is the number of analysts that make forecasts for a firm in a given fiscal year. The Anti-self-dealing index measures the average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing; it potentially ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating better shareholder protection. The index is obtained from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . The low Anti-self-dealing subsample consists of countries that score below our sample median of 0.5 on the Anti-self-dealing index. All other firm-level variables are described in Table 3 ; Appendix A provides descriptions of the voting variables. All time-varying independent variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the meeting. Indicator variables for years, countries, and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell (1996) and specifically excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity by institutional investors. Analysts, obtained from I/B/E/S, is the number of analysts that make forecasts for a firm in a given fiscal year. The Securities regulation measure potentially ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as in Hail and Leuz (2006) as the average of the disclosure requirements, liability standards, and public enforcement indexes, which are obtained from Table 2 of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) . The low Securities regulation subsample contains countries that score below our sample median of 0.52 on the Securities regulation measure. All other firm-level variables are described in Table 3 ; Appendix A provides descriptions of the voting variables. All time-varying independent variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the meeting. Indicator variables for years, countries, and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell (1996)) are included but not reported. The t-statistics are in brackets and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms.
* , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. and specifically excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity by institutional investors. Analysts, obtained from I/B/E/S, is the number of analysts that make forecasts for a firm in a given fiscal year. The Disclosure requirements measure potentially ranges from 0 to 1 and is obtained from Table 2 of La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) . The high Disclosure requirements subsample contains countries that score above our sample median of 0.75 on the Disclosure Requirements measure.. All other firm-level variables are described in Table 3 ; Appendix A provides descriptions of the voting variables. All time-varying independent variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the meeting. Indicator variables for years, countries, and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell (1996)) are included but not reported. The t-statistics are in brackets and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms. The table reports OLS regression estimates of the percentage of U.S. institutional investors' votes cast against management's recommendations for agenda items proposed at a firm's shareholder meetings for a given fiscal year on subsamples of countries without and with Common law legal origin as indicated in Table 2 This measure captures insider holdings and specifically excludes shares held in a fiduciary capacity by institutional investors. Analysts, obtained from I/B/E/S, is the number of analysts that make forecasts for a firm in a given fiscal year. All other firm-level variables are described in Table 3 ; Appendix A provides descriptions of the voting variables. All time-varying independent variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the meeting. Indicator variables for years, countries, and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell (1996)) are included but not reported. The t-statistics are in brackets and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms.
* , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Against management is the percentage of votes cast against management's recommendations for all agenda items proposed at a firm's shareholder meetings. We count votes as against management's recommendations when management recommended "For" and investors voted "Against" or "Abstain"; or when management recommended "Against" and investors voted "For" or "Abstain." ISS against management is the percentage of which ISS recommended to vote against management's recommendations. The last row of Panel B reports the Chi 2 test statistic and associated p-value in parentheses for a test of the degree of association between the two variables in the table, Against management and ISS against management. The null hypothesis tested is that the vote outcome against management does not differ across ISS recommendation. All other variables are described in Table 3 . The voting data are from BNYMellon, and the data for firm-level variables are from Worldscope. The table reports OLS regression estimates of the percentage of votes cast against management's recommendations on the frequency of which ISS recommended to vote against management. The sample is based on the BNYMellon data introduced in Table 9 . Column 1 shows the baseline regression results including firms from all countries. Columns 2-7 sorts firms into subsamples based on legal institutions variables. Variables are described in Tables 3 and 8 . The Anti-selfdealing index measures the average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing. The index is obtained from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . The Securities regulation measure is defined as in Hail and Leuz (2006) as the average of the disclosure requirements, liability standards, and public enforcement indexes, which are obtained from Table 2 of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) . The Disclosure requirements measure is obtained from Table 2 of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) . We use the same cutoffs to group firms into low and high subsamples as in Tables 5-7 . Indicator variables for industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell (1996)) are included but not reported. The t-statistics are in brackets and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering on firms. 
